Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Sociology Faculty Articles and Research

Sociology

2014

Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of
New Media on Contemporary Social Movements
and Challenges for Social Movement Theory
Victoria Carty
Chapman University, carty@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/sociology_articles
Part of the African History Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons,
Islamic World and Near East History Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Social
History Commons, and the Social Influence and Political Communication Commons
Recommended Citation
Carty, Victoria. 2014. “Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of New Media on Contemporary Social Movements and
Challenges for Social Movement Theory.” International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 51(1): 51-80.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Sociology Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt: The Impact of New Media on
Contemporary Social Movements and Challenges for Social Movement
Theory
Comments

This article was originally published in International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, volume 51, issue 1, in
2014.
Copyright

Auburn University/Joensuu University Press

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/sociology_articles/12

ARAB SPRING IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT:
THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CHALLENGES FOR SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY
Victoria Carty
Chapman University
ABSTRAcT
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Th~ events of Arab Spring were shocking for those who study
soctal movements as long-term dictators were swiftly removed
from office and a democratic wave hit the region. Although
the outcomes of the Arab Spring revolutions are yet to be
determined, what we can gleam from these outbursts of
c~U~ctive behavior is that new media platforms played a
stgruficant role in the planning and mobilization efforts that
brought people onto the streets and posed serious challenges to
~e existing political systems. This paper examines the
llnportance of the communication field in influencing the
political environment and motivating ordinary citizens to
engage in contentious politics. I argue that these two social
movements call for an expansion of social movement theory
because the digital revolution has expanded the parameters
~thin which groups and individuals can voice concerns, share
information, and organize protest activities. Because the
resources, organizational processes and structure, and sources
of connectivity and communication that activists rely on are
different than in earlier eras, we must theorize and
conceptualize collective behavior in new ways as current
social movements tend to rely on self-organizing and flexible
grassroots networks made possible through new information
communication technologies (ICfs) and other web-based
tools.

Over the past several years there has been an explosion. of
Pto~est activity among young people around !?~ globe demanding
radical changes in the existing economic and po~ttlcal s~stems as they
etnbrace a new vision of the future. Arab Spnng, which broke out
International Journal ofContemporazy Sociology • Volume 51, No. 1 • April2014
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across parts of the Middle East and North Africa three years ago, in
particular took the world by storm. Entrenched dictators who .had
oppressed their citizens for dozens of years were suddenly under Stege
and a few were removed from office as a democratic wave hit the
region, at least temporarily.
. .
These uprisings were originally greeted with great optmusm
throughout much of the world, yet, what we have learned from Arab
Spring is that democracy is not an easy thing to accomplish. To t?e
contrary, in some cases the protests have led to a revival of extr~st
groups striving to grasp political power, and/or the transfer of pohttcal
power from one authoritarian form of government to another. The
outcomes of the Arab Spring revolutions, including the countries of
Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and others are yet to be
determined, but what is clear is that new media platforms played a
significant role in the planning and mobilization efforts that br?~t
people onto the streets and posed serious challenges to extstmg
political systems.
Giroux (2012) emphasizes the importance of ~e
communication field, and consequently, the political environment. m
motivating contentious politics. He summarizes, "Alternative
newspapers, progressive media, and a profound sense of the political
constitute elements of a vibrant, critical formative culture within a
wide range of public spheres that have helped nurture and sustain ~e
possibility to think critically, engage in political dissent, org~e
collectively, and inhabit public spaces in which alternative and cntical
theories can be developed" (p. 39). In essence, he argues that it is the
media ecology which can either accelerate or serve as an obstacle to
serious political discussion and debate and ultimately facilitate
'
displays of collective behavior.
. . One of ~e things that the Arab Spring social movements
highlight, and which calls for an expansion of social movement theory,
is th~t ~~ the digital revolution the parameters within which gro~s
and mdiV1duals can voice concerns, share information, and orgamze
protest activities have expanded immensely. With new media
technology at activists' disposal social movement actors have access to
inn?vative comm~cation outlets that foster a political terrain within
which ~~y can discuss grievances and collectively make demands.
The upr1smgs also suggest that because the resources, organizational
process~ ~d structure, and sources of connectivity and
commwucatton that activists rely on are different than in earlier eras.
we must theorize and conceptualize collective behavior in new ways
as ~ent social movements tend to rely on self-organizing and
flextble ~oots networks made possible through new information
comm\Ullcatton technologies (ICfs) and other web-based tools.
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In this paper I focus on the Arab Spring outbreaks in Tunisia
and Egypt and document how disenfranchised youth took advantage of
emerging wired technological formats in their respective countries to
create mediated communities, networks and identities that decolonized
public opinion by expanding discourse in civil society. This helped
them to challenge the existing social and political structures. More
specifically, this exploratory inquiry seeks to refme our understanding
of the substantial impact that digital technology is having on social
movement activity by addressing the ways in which ICTs accelerate
movement activity, play a role in decentralizing mobilizations,
facilitate recruitment efforts through virtual forms of collective
identity, assist in the sharing of grievances that leads to contentious
politics on the streets, and can be used to hold authorities accountable
for their responses to protest activity.
The case studies also contribute to the literature on social
movements as well as the research on ICTs by engaging in an
interdisciplinary approach that incudes political science, sociology,
and media studies. For example, much of the research on social
~ovements relies on a particular theory that focuses exclusively on
etther the reasons why social movements emerge at the macro-level
(many from a political science perspective), or how they manifest
themselves at the micro-level (more sociologically-oriented analyses).
Theories of the Internet and other web-based tools, on the other hand,
tend to overlook the broader context of social movement activity; its
emergence, sustenance and outcome. This study, alternatively,
assesses the complex ways in which structural- and micro-level
mobilization efforts are interconnected as afforded by new media.
I begin by outlining the various social movement theories and
note how the digital revolution has an impact on the way that we
understand collective behavior and contentious politics. The paper
then discusses the two case studies of Tunisia and Egypt and their
theoretical relevance. Because the emergence, development, and
outcomes of political transformation are always complex, I_ ?pply
aspects of the different theories to conceptually and empmcally
understand the events and also highlight some of their limitations
given the advent of new media and its impact on mobilizing efforts.

DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
I chose the cases of Tunisia and Egypt because these uprisings
represent two very recent social movements that were ~expecte? _but
shared a common theme of demanding the end of _nepotism, po~ttical
corruption, and economic injustice and replacmg these With a
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democratic system that would enhance economic growth and hold
political and economic elites accountable. I do not engage in a
comparative study in the traditional sense, meaning that I do not focus
heavily on the commonalities vs. particularities of the cases in a
systematic manner. Rather, my theoretical interest in these
mobilizations is to examine how structural and micro-level factors can
be mitigated through new technology to spark and maintain
contentious politics in public spaces.
The data are drawn from a variety of sources including
scholarly materials, the mainstream and alternative press,
organizational sources, and the Internet. The data collection consists of
news sources located in the LexisNexis archive and Google searches
including key words such as, Arab Spring Twitter hashtags, Bouazi~.
Arab Spring Youtube, Ennahda, April 6 committee, Khalid Said,
January 25 Day of Rage, Tahrir Square, Facebook Arab Spring, an.d
alternative press Arab Spring among others. For the purposes of~
article I was not sampling documents per se, but rather accessmg
information and materials that help to clarify the emergen~e,
developments, dynamics, and outcomes of these two social
movements that can be analyzed under the rubric of social movement
theory.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
According to Tilly (2004), the three main elements of social
movements are campaigns (sustained, organized public efforts that
make collective claims on target authorities), repertoires (tactics that a
gro~ has at its disposal within a particular socio-political
envtro~ent), and WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, ~d
comrottment). Key to any social movement are mobilizing strategtes,
"those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal through which
people mobilize and engage in collective action" {hlcAdam et al.
199?:3). Tilly refers to these as a ..repertoire of contention" -the
~ctical fonns from which social movement actors can choose at any
gtven moment.
Theories that attempt to explain the why of social movelllents
(or .~e emergence of collective behavior) include political process,
po~Itical mediation, and resource mobilization theories and are
onlented toward macro-level dynamics at the societal and/or state
1
evel p 0 rti
1
• :
~a process theory contends that agents evaluate the
po~tic~ envtr~~ and make calculations about the likely impact of
colite~alve action pnor to their engagement in the struggle. It is the
po tc . context that influences the claimS
·
· pursue, the
they Wlll
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alliances that they are likely to ferment, and which political strategies
and tactics they will choose (Amenta and Caren 2004). Though some
groups may have an insurgent consciousness, because political
opportunities (referring to the receptivity or vulnerability of the
existing political system to challenge) are not open, there is little
chance of a successful mobilization and outcome (Tarrow and Tilly
2006). This vulnerability can be the result of one or a combination of
any of the following: a decline in state repression (and thus increased
tolerance for protest), fragmentation among political elites, electoral
instability, broadening access to institutional participation, and support
of organized opposition by elites (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).
This paradigm, however, disregards activists' perception of
available opportunities and the lenses through which they view
potential opportunities for participation in contentious politics, i.e.
their subjective perceptions of reality and interpretive frameworks as
limited as the achievements may be. To address these shortcomings
theorists of contentious politics introduced the political mediation
model which examines the way in which the social and political
context that participants are situated in intersects with the strategic
choices that they make (Gamson 1990). It also recognizes that
opportunities are indeed situational, fluid, and volatile because they
depend on the way actors perceive and define the situation before
deciding what action, if any, should be taken (Meyer and Minkoff
2004). Another mediating signal that this model takes into
consideration is public opinion and the ability of social movement
actors to influence this in a way favorable to their cause (Soule and
King2006).
Resource mobilization theory has traditionally argued that
social movements are formed by rational social actors who engage in
strategic political action and rely on well-established social movem~t
organizations (SMOs) to further their agenda (McAdam 19~2; !tlly
2004). This perspective contends that having formal. ?rgaru~tional
structures in place are pre-requisites for collective pohtical action.. In
addition to SMOs other resources include knowledge, experttse,
money, media atter:tion, time, allies, and support from political elites.
Participants are characterized as purposeful and motivated to support _a
~ampaign on the basis of a calculation of the costs and benefits of thetr
mvolvement.
More culturally centered theories focus on the ?~w of
mobilization efforts or the dynamics of social movement a~vtty by
·
'
· "d tity d framing at the
Paymg attention to processes of collectxve 1 en
an
~cro-level of analysis. These suggest that actors. are not merely
uttlity-m · ·
b
ft immersed in comnuttnents to others
. . axumzers ut are o en
.
"call rooted in a
and It ts broader ethical or moral senttments, typt Y
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strong sense of collective identity, that lead to participation in
contentious politics. Melucci (1996) defmes collective identity as :m
interactive, shared process that links individuals or groups to a soctal
movement through sustained interaction. It is through this identity that
individuals recognize they share certain orientations and grievances,
and organize political campaigns through their collaborative efforts.
Cultural explanations of social movement activity ~so
highlight the importance of framing and assert that key to forgmg
collective identity and articulating shared meanings is the way
organizers ..frame" their issues to resonate with potential recruits. In
other words, to build solidarity activists attempt to link participants'
grievances to mainstream beliefs and values (Benford 1993). A frame
is defined as an interpretive schema that an individual or group uses to
interpret reality, on an ideological basis, by selectively omitting and
emphasizing various aspects of the world (Snow et al. 1986). Frames
are commonly referred to as ..injustice frames" that contain implicit or
explicit appeals to moral principles (Ryan and Gamson 2006). For
framing to be influential organizers must persuade large numbers of
people that the issues they care about are urgent, that alternatives are
possible, that there is a worthiness (or moral standing) of the ca~e,
and that the constituencies they seek to mobilize can be invested With
agency.
Other theorists focus on the consequences, or outcomes, of
mobilizing efforts. Some scholars argue that successful outcomes
occur either when the challengers' goals are realized or when the
target of collective action recognizes the challengers as legitima!e
representatives of a constituency, thereby altering the relationshiP
between the challengers and target (Marullo and Meyer 2~04).
MeA~ (1982) argues that either undermining the structural basts of
the pobtical. system ~r enhancing the strategic position of insurgent
challengers Is beneficial because both increase the political leverage of
the challengers.

THEORIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
. . The introduction of digital technology has led to new forms of

actt~sm that challenge some aspects of the theoretical frameworks

previously outlined. All social movements are shaped by the
technology available at the time and influence the tactics that social
modvement actors pursue, how they share and distribute information.
an . the terms. und whi ch they mobilize support. New media

1

<:

~:orms ~?VIde ~al movement actors with additional resources. in

I

repert tre which help them develop different types of connectiVe
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capabilities and creates a new communication field that allows them to
alter the power relations between insurgents and the target of dissent in
a number of ways.
. For example, theorists have long noted that social networks,
relational ties, and friendships are an invaluable resource by serving as
a conduit of information and as a channel through which to recruit
people to a cause, and especially for high-risk protest movement
actions (Diani 1995; Verba and Brady 1995). Other research has found
that an invitation through a personal tie is one of the strongest
?redictors of individuals' engagement in activism (Gould 1993), which
m turn fosters collective identity. The introduction of revolutionary
ICTs has greatly expanded the potential of these networks to develop
and mutate exponentially, and especially through weak ties.
McAdam and Paulsen (1993), for instance, argue that although
the strength of social ties influences recruitment on the individual level
(as argued by resource mobilization theory), weak social ties forged in
the virtual sphere can be effective in communicating and spreading
messages about social movement activity across diffuse networks.
Since participants in social movements are often recruited through
preexisting social ties (this could be friends, neighbors, co-workers,
fellow students, church members or other acquaintances), they assert
~~ an additional context is necessary to better detennine the nature of
mdtviduals' interpersonal social ties to a particular social movement
Today, this additional context is cyberspace.
The question of collective identity is at the heart of the
scholarly debate regarding bow digital ICfs affect collective behavi_or.
A r:lated inquiry points to the relationship, if any, bem:e.en ~nlme
shanng of information and participation in contentious pohttcs m ~1
commtmities. Much of the research finds that rather than replacmg
~llective identity (as feared by some scholars, for ~x~ple see
Hindman 2007; Jordan 2001), mediated forms ofcommum~tton often
COmplement those based on face-to-face interaction (Boulamne 2009;
1enkins 2006). This is important because many .a~ti'?sts. and
.Particularly youth, receive information about ~o~thzattans and
COntentious (as well as electoral) politics through digt~ channels ~f
t~hnology from people they trust. This in ~ ~~ ~etr
likelihood of participation as they may no! ~etve this infonnatton
throUgh any other communicative format (GtUgnt 1998).
Furthermore Boulainne's (2009) research reveals that the
instantaneo
t'
bann·g allows for the development of
us peer- o-peer s
be . and that
~ollective identity before protest activity on the strec:t. gms •
•-"'
.
on1·me acu·vt·ty is r~-~tvely assoctated
<U~.orntational content through
th
with increased political partt"cipation. Jenkins (2006) uses Je tderm
.. · ·
· mediums can ea to
CtVIc media" to describe bow new electroniC
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face-to-face civic engagement and a participatory culture on the
ground in the form of contentious politics, what he refers to as the
"spillover'' effect. Thus, we can consider these technology-enabled
networks as hybrids in that they do not result in mere "clicktivism" but
rather encourage viewers of information to engage in contentious
politics if they feel the issues are urgent and that they have a sense of
agency.
New media technologies also substantially shift the way th~t
activists can create distribute and consume information. This
broadens the public' sphere of 'communication because they allow
organizers to quickly and cheaply reach a critical mass, in contrast to
the one-to-many flow of information through mainstream media (Van
Aelst and Walgrave 2003). This facilitates the development ~f
community in spite of physical distance, creating virtual publ~c
spheres (Kahn and Kellner 2003). Castells (2001) refers
this
explosive type of informational politics as leading to a new kind 0
civil society based on the "electronic grassrooting of democracy.
Additionally, these new types of information sharing potentially o~er
a mode of communication that is resistant to state regulation, red~~mg
authorities' capacity to repress the distribution of pobt~c~
communication, and thereby gives rise to a new type of ctVJC
engagement at the grassroots level (Bennett and Iyengar 2008). In
sum, new media challenges the hard physical power of the state
through the soft power new information technologies (Nie 2001 ).
.
Finally, scholars also highlight that new media allows for, and
m fact encourages, new organizational structures of social movements.
!ufekci (2012) contends that this new media ecology, and its viftual
infrastructure, helps to build networks of coordinated action that are
loo~ly articulated, decentralized, egalitarian and pluralistic. These
~tal m~v~c:m communities permit multiple memberships and part·
time Participation, and there is little if any distinction between leaders
and rank~and-file members, members and non-members, and pri~te
and ~ubhc roles. Mann (2000) describes these networks as "interstittal
locattons that consist of the nooks
d
·
· and aroWid the
dominant . .
an cranntes m
al
and bl k:ttbytutions" (51)..~e argues that groups that are margin d
oc .
the prevadmg institutions can link together an
cooperate m ways that transcend these institutions
interstitiT~y, ~ew digital media is par excellen~e for creating these
that
al ocations as social movement actors now operate in ways
. are. ess dependent on leaders and function in a more ad hOC
manner m tenns of nnr.n.;....;..
·
r t
on SMOs Additi -·~·&than previous ones which were re tan
digital. ~orks :lly, new. organizational processes enable~. by
•I!TnJin beca
transfonnmg organized dissent and the polittcal
use they do not rely on traditional and external

t?

!

resources
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such as access to mainstream media or professional leadership.
~tead,. they are supported by informal and grassroots networks. Such
mnovatiVe types of connective action have led to the emergence of a
personalized digitally networked politics in which diverse individuals
address common problems that can lead to collective behavior
(Bennett and Segerberg 2012).
However, there are certain caveats, in addition to the question
of collective identity (addressed above) regarding the role of new
technology in social movement activity. As the case studies which
follow illustrate, new media structures, created through digital tools
based on past email communications and Internet use, can be traced by
elites. State authorities can also monitor and censor online activity
through surveillance and repression through their own social media,
especially when material is deemed political or critical of the
government (Morozov 2011 ). Digital ICTs further enable authorities to
manipulate activists' agendas and activities by following their online
tracks and forming pre-planned responses to protest activities, and by
blocking access to or shutting down access to the Internet, social
networking sites, and mobile phones.

ARAB SPRING
Although several countries experienced Arab Spring ~v~ts
wh~ ordinary citizens surprisingly began to challenge authontanan
Tegnnes that had ruled for decades with little respect for the fonnal
realm of political processes, this analysis focuses speci_ficaUy on !he
cas~ of Tunisia and Egypt. In both of these countnes represstve
regunes managed to sustain political power in l~e Pa:t through
censorship and/or limiting access to news and informatton vta state nm
media (Howard and Hussain 2013). Under these circtmlStaJlces. there
~e few, if any, public channels for citizens to openly discuss
gn:~ances or dissent, or to resist the ideological control th~! the
JlOhtical dynasties maintained through their monopoly on tradtttonal
ntedia.
..
Therefore, digital media and social networking. ~ites .pla~ed a
tnbcal role in bringing decade's old grievances to ~.uon m vt~
and public displays of collective behavior. The mtt~al campatgns
~ through wired activism as Tunisians and Egypll~ started to
1_t
er-..
:~c.
·
1
that
- .... Uli:l e .uuormatton amongst themse ves
. was cntJcal of the.
government. According to the Arab Social Media Report b~ the ~
Sc~ool of Government, the most popular Twitter hashtags tn the .
region during the first three months of 2011 (when Arab Spnng
erupted) were "Egypt". "Jan25" "Libya". "Bahrain" and "protest," all
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of which provided information and updates about the growing
revolutionary fervor across the region (Huang 2011).
These digitally enabled communication systems enhanced the
realm of public discussion, debate, and communicative action through
the grassroots distribution of information that circumvented the
mainstream and state-owned media. In fact, during the protests in
Egypt and Tunisia most citizens (who participated in Arab Sp~g)
reported that they received their information about the revolutions
from social media sites (88% in Egypt and 94% in Tunisia), and 56~o
in Egypt and 59% in Tunisia said it had a positive effect in that tt
motivated them to sustain their participation in the social mov~~ent
events (Huang 2012). Almost 90% of Egyptians and Tumstans
surveyed (again, those who participated in Arab Spring) in March of
2011 said they were using Facebook to organize protests or ~read
awareness about them (Huang 2012). There was an intematt~nal
component of the digital activity as well. For example, an analys_IS of
more than three million tweets that contained some of the most Widely
used hashtag codes pertaining to the Arab revolts, such as #Egypt and
@sidbouzid found that the major spikes in usage were driven by
tweeters living outside of the Middle East (Stepanova 2011).

TUNISIA ARAB SPRING
The driving forces behind the Tunisia revolution were a
c~binati~ of political corruption and nepotism exercised by the
dictator, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, food inflation, high unemployment,
and overall poor living conditions (Pollock 2013). The country also
had a long history of a lack of political expression for citizens and _a
censored Jl!ess. When Ali came to power in 1987 all forms of media
were forbidden until a small conservative television station was
allo~ed to broadcast in 2003 (Pollock 2013). Later, in 2009 Ben Ali's
son-m-law purchased a publishing house that printed four newspa~·
Thus, wb~ the revolution in Tunisia began the majority of m~Jor
news medta sourcc:s. were controlled by a member of Ben Ali's f~ly.
The condrttons were ripe for political upheaval espectallY
when the global ec~~c crisis, which began in 2008, affected 1a:se
segments of the Tu:rustan middle class. At the time of the revoluttOll
~~l~yment was 14% and youth unemployment was 23% (Solnit
l"fh ~"n:~hat was n~ ~ a spark. This occurred on Decetnbef
graduate withohamed B~. a twenty-six year old jobless college
~ computer SCience degree, set himself on fire in front of
the s·1di B
work and ;;:d regtonal COUncil (Solnit 2012). Unable to fmd stea~
..
. g to support a family of eight, he resorted to selling fruit

Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt

61

~d vegetables on the street. The police seized his produce because he
dtd not have a license.
.
His situation was common among youth living in the povertyndden area of Sidi Bouzid. Many high school graduates (as was
Bouazizi) and college educated youth are unable to fmd dignified
employment. As a result they gravitate toward the informal economy
for employment opportunities. In Bouazizi's case, not only was he
fined, but he was also treated harshly by a female police officer who
allegedly physically and verbally abused him (Abouzeid 2011). In
response to the indignity he was subject to Bouazizi attempted to file a
complaint to the local authorities at the provincial headquarters, but
wa:' denied an opportunity to speak with anyone (Abouzeid 2011).
This sense of desperation and indignity resonated with other
unemployed and alienated youth immediately, and later with scores of
other Tunisian citizens across all age groups.
. . The availability of new media helped to influence public
0P~on when the pictures of Bouazizi's self-immolation spread
raptdly in cyberspace. Citizens recorded the tragedy on their mobile
phones and posted them on the Internet and Facebook, which were
then uploaded onto mainstream broadcasting sites by the international
news group, AI Jazeera (Laghmari and K.asseem 2011). The day after
Bouazizi's death Tunisians flocked to a common Twitter hashtag
calling for a march the next day. Tweets mentioning Tunisia showed
~ ~ Twitter streams as many as 329 million times, reaching. ~6
mtlhon Twitter users. The most retweeted account, @Voiceoffurusta
with its 496 followers was retweeted over 400 times (Laghmari and
Kasseem 2011). This distribution of information and planning of the
mobilization efforts in cyberspace resonates with McAdam and
Paulson's argument about the importance of weak social ti~ that
develop in the virtual world and help spread messages across dtffuse
networks. The developments are also relevant to Jenkin's
conceptualization of "civic media" and support Bennett and
S~gerberg' s fmdings that show how digitally networked individuals. as
diverse as they may be, can use public media platf~ to express
COtnmon grievances that later lead to contentious pohttcs at the local
level.
For weeks Tunisians protested throughout the ~try ~don
January 11 lh demonstrators reached the center ·of the cap1tal c~ty of
Tunis <Levine 2011). The police responded with a harsh and ~tolent
':""ckdown and the images of the abuse, which were recorded m ~
titn~ provided more visual ammunition for .bloggets and onhne
P<>litical activists around the globe. International support encouraged
the demonstrators to not only continue, but to mnp up tbe ~;5
The next day tens of thousands took to tbe stteels in Sfax. Twusta
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second largest city. After blogger Majdi Calboussi's recorded the
protests and police violence on his blackberry, which he then uploaded
onto Twitter and Y ouTube, the video got half a million hits the first
day alone and fueled the outrage (Levine 2011). Diani (1995), ~erba
(1995) and Gould (1991) all emphasize the crucial role of relatt~~al
ties as an important resource for sharing information and recruttmg
individuals to a cause, and this is what transpired in Tunisia.
Though the regime blocked Y ouTube during the month of
unrest, it did not entirely block Internet access, and cyber activists took
advantage of this by playing bridging roles in the communication field.
They re-posted videos and Facebook content about protests from
closed loops of private networks to twitter and online news portals
with greater reach (Safranek 2012). Additionally, during the first two
weeks of January 2011 there was an eight percent surge in the number
of Facebook users, coupled with a shift in the usage from one being
mostly social in nature to one more politically-oriented (Safranek
2012). Boulainne addresses how the distinction of what individuals
use new media for correlates with political engagement, and suggests
that when citizens utilize digital media sites for political and
knowledge-based reasons rather than entertainment the likelihood of
political participation increases. This too is supported by Arab Spring
in Tunisia.
Alternative media sites such as Tunisia Live were also vital to
the mobilization because they published stories, photos and videos of
the revolution that were not covered in the mainstream press. Tunisia
Live served as a citizen media initiative that connected Tunisia with
the English-speaking world, and spread the story globally (Solnit
2012~. Nawaat, the Tunisian blogging group, set up a Web site called
"Turuleaks" that widely distributed the cables to Tunisian citizens.
Once the protests gained momentum the government complet~ly
blocked the Internet, Facebook and YouTube. This made alternative
news outlets even more vital to the mobilization.
.
Despite ~e government's attempt at censorship activists found
~ous ways to wcumvent the blackout. They used landlines to pho~e
m !We;te~ messages through Google's makeshift alliance Wlth
Twttter s .Speak to Tweet" service (Buhler-Muller and der M~e
2011). This once again delineates how important it is for sOCial
movement act~ to control the narrative and in Nie's (2001) words,
how the physt~al power of authorities can be mediated by the soft
power. ~f new ~onnation technologies. Mann's conceptualization of
mterstitial I~ons through which activists, working at the grassroots
!evel, · ~ CU"CUmvent mainstream institutions and disseminate
infonn~tton and organize is also pertinent to our understanding the
unfolding of the Tunisian revolution..
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. . ~e Tt~isian regime eventually lost legitimacy as public
op~on shtfted m support of the young insurgents and galvanized their
allies. Ben Ali promised to create 300,000 jobs in the next two years

and that he would not run for re-election (after having ruled for
twenty-three years). He also guaranteed more freedom and civil rights
However, thousands of protesters continued to
to Turustans.
· ·
demonstrate and demand that he vacate immediately. The president
eventually announced the end of his reign and the dissolution of the
government within six months and fled to Saudi Arabia in exile
(Solnit 2012).
'
Activists recognized the crucial role that social media tools
played in the ousting of the regime in their celebratory gatherings. For
ex~ple, after the fall of Ali, banners and graffiti throughout the
capttal read 'We Love Twitter," and "We Love Facebook" (Solnit
2012). However, it is important to acknowledge that although
tec~ology played a major role in the uprising, there are other
vanables that enabled the mobilization efforts that social movement
theory can help clarify. Political process theory is limited in its ability
to explain the outbreak of protest activity because the formal political
syst~m. was relatively closed under the Ali dictatorship. Political
medtahon theory, on the other hand, which directs our attention to the
rot: o~ public opinion and the perception of political openings, and
~li~f ~ a possible victory despite a closed political ~ystem at the
~~~tionallevel, is useful in understanding how the soct~ movement
Ctivtty transpired. One successful aspect of the revolu~on. was ~e
removal of Ali from office. What aided this was the shift m public
op~on that favored the activists as they increasingly, ~d quict?Y·
gamed a sense of Tilly's concept of WUNC (worthiness, um1?',
:um~s and commitment), and therefore legitimacy as a ~~hd
onstttuency promoting social change. ~ou~ . the pohttcal
transformation is still a work in progress, Tumstan ctttzens were able
to undermine the structural basis of the political system and theref~re
strategically gained leverage over the authorities, thus supporting
McAdam's definition of one of the positive consequences of protest
activity.
.l. · theory is also
.
An updated version of resource mob1 tzatton
.
Important in understanding the uprising because the most opttmal
resources were digital tools rather than those
by
SMOs or professional leadership. Money, labor-intenstve org~g,
1
and expertise were also less relevant than was access . ~ new medta.
Cultural theories are also informative because the acti~sts were not
necessarily utility-maximizers but had a shared set of gnevances that
they articulated through an injustice frame and which was embedded
in moral · ·
· ~~cular the sense of indignity that they felt
prmctp1es-tnP<U"

provi~ed

f?~al
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subject to by the authorities. Additionally, the participants carefully
framed their issues in ways that included not just the concerns o~ youth
but of society as a whole, and in this way were able to recrutt ~~
members both online and offiine, and ultimately challenge the stabtlrty
of the government.

POST REVOLUTION TUNISIA
After Ben Ali's departure Tunisian citizens held sit-ins, strikes
and riots throughout the country demanding legal recourse. The
interim Tunisian government eventually issued an arrest warran~
charging Ali for money laundering and drug trafficking. He and his
wife were sentenced to thirty-five years in prison on June 20th of 20 ~ 1
(Adetunji 2011). Then again, on August 15th protesters engaged Ul
direct action by flooding the streets and called for immediate refonns
including the formation of an independent judiciary that could put
corrupt officials and the killers of the "Revolution Martyrs" on trial for
the death of the twenty-three civilians (Bohler-Muller and der Merwe
2011). As a result, the Prime Minister resigned, the police force was
dissolved, and political prisoners were released. The int~
government announced a new Constitution and on October 21
Tunisians had the opportunity to vote in the first free and fair election
in twenty-four years. The Islamist party, Ennahda was voted into
power, yet agreed to step down in late September of 2013 due 0
months of political upheaval and discontent with the party, and ID
particular its attempt to mandate that Islam be the official religion of
Tunisia in the Constitution (Gall2013).
There are currently plans for new elections in the spring of
2014 and in the meantime Ennahda has agreed to transmit power to an
independent interim government. However, an attempt to transition
from an authoritarian political type of governance to a peaceful
democracy is facing challenges. There is a growing fear that a neW
theocracy may hinder the creation of a genuine civil society as the
deb~~ over the role of Islam in the framing of the constitution and the
poh~r~al pr~cess more generally continues (Bellin 2013). Additionally,
as CIVIl sOCiety has opened up following the departure of Ali there are
now over one hundred political parties that are registered, manY
obscure and unknown by most Tunisians and who are not onlY
compe~g ~!h Ennahda but almost among tltemselves (Bellin 2013).
Thus, m additton t.o addressing the role of religion in political life there
are' further questions regarding the representation of the different
groups in political life.
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EGYPT ARAB SPRING
The success story of Tunisia spread throughout the region via
cyberspace and as a result other regimes began to face similar
challenges. As was the case in Tunisia, the list of grievances in Egypt
Wlder President Hosni Mubarak's tenure was long. It was a group of
YOWlg individuals that called themselves the April 6 Movement, and
who began mobilizing years before the Arab Spring revolution, which
blazed the trail for the Egyptian Arab Spring (Souaiaia 2011). In fact,
Egypt experienced thousands of labor protests as early as 2004 that
were organized by the labor movement in conjunction with April 6.
Workers held a strike on April 6th of 2004 (thus inspiring the name of
the. movement) at a textile factory run by the government outside of
Carro. This initiated other strikes that activists advertised on a
Facebook page and through which citizens began demanding
Mubarak's departure (Souaiaia 2011). When the government
attem~ted to break the strike by using riot police labor activists, yomtg
Egypttans, and other sectors of the population formed the "6 April
Committee." This coalition later organized the January 25th occupation
of Tahrir Square which called for the end of Mubarak's rule, and
Egypt soon exploded into a full-blown revolution.
Resource mobilization theory highlights the significance of
ne~~rking among SMOs and other coalitions as a powerful force in
asststing social movement organizing, which is relevant to th~ early
sta~es of Arab Spring in Egypt. What is different, however~ ~s that
dunng the beginning phase of Arab Spring ICTs allowed actiVIsts to
reach a critical mass quickly through peer-to-peer networks and to
create "virtual public spheres" that Kahn and Kellner (2003) refer to.
As a result, they were able to establish avenues of civic engagement at
the grassroots level which Bennett and Iyenga (2008) regard as
essential to social 'movement efforts, and what Castells (200 ~)
underscores as the grassrooting of democracy through new medta
platforms.
.
While occupying the square activists expanded ~eir list ?f
gnevances and demands. Complaints included Mubarak s role m
maintaining the blockade against Qaza, his acceptance of the
Privatization measures imposed by the International Mone~ Fund
and World Bank, the fact that half of the Egyptian populat~on was
sustaining itself on $2.00 a day, the lack of freedom of exp~sston, :md
excessive human rights abuses (Kuebler 2011). Amateur Journalists,
h
·d os circulated first-band accounts of
through th ·
h
err ce11p one VI e ,
.
..
, rights and
lllldreds of cases of police abuse and disregard for CI~~ •
•
8pread them globally. In this way digitally-arme? Cittzen Jou:nahsts
evaded state authorities and the mainstream media to get therr story
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out and create their own account of the events, thereby exemplifying
Mann's emphasis on the importance of interstitial locations. This new
transparency, developed and sustained through connective action via a
digitally-rooted politics, is also representative of Bennett and
Segerberg's contention that new media has a profound impact on
transmitting personal complaints into connnon demands.
Another comparison to Tunisia is that disaffected youth make
up a significant percentage of the population in Egypt; the average age
in the country is twenty-four and 60% of the population is under the
age of twenty-five (Kuebler 2011 ). Egyptians too had a martyr ~th
the beating to death of an Egyptian citizen at the hands of the pohce
and this culminated in the largest protests in the country in fifty years
(Preston 2011 ). On June 6th police pulled K.halid Said, a twenty-eight
year old Egyptian and underemployed businessman from an Internet
cafe and beat and killed him because he had distributed evidence of
police corruption by hacking into a police officer's cell phone. He also
widely distributed a video of officers displaying drugs and stacks of
cash.
Following the incident, Google executive and activist, Wael
Ghonim created a Facebook page, "We are Al K.halid Said" that
commemorated Said by posting cellphone photos from the morgue and
YouTube videos that juxtaposed pictures of him happy and smiling
with those of him beaten and bloodied. This was the biggest dissident
Faceb~k page in Egypt and helped spread the word about the
upcommg demonstrations in protest of police brutality and lack of
acc.ot.mtability (Preston 2011). It was also through this digital site ~t
actiVIsts began to build a sense of collective identity and orgaruze
contentious politics on the streets. The uprising, therefore, lends
cr~dence to Bennett and Iyenagar's reference to the pivotal role of the
spillover e~ect - organizing efforts that begin on the Internet or
through sOCial networking sites that result in demonstrations on the
streets.
..
~or example, in the days preceding what organizers called
Revolution. Day" 85,000 people committed to participate in ~e
protests online (framed as a stand against torture, poverty, corruption
and unemployment) to be held on January 25th. Activists picked
January 25th as "Revolution Day'' because it is a national holiday to
commemorate the police forces, later calling it a "Day of Rage."
!Jtat .day over 100,000 marched throughout the country and
10,000 m Carro alone; the largest to ever take place in the downtown
area (Preston 2011). Police and demonstrators clashed and the officers
fired tear gas and used water cannons against the protesters (AP PreSS
2012). A few days later, after viewing th b
t·u·cal aroups
and
lifcal
.
. e a use, s
po 1
e- •
1
po.
Parties announced theu participation in the upcoJllll]8
txty"
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, protests, caUed "Frid
. .
(McNally 2012) p
ay of !Jigruty,'' or "Second Day of Rage"
several days.
· rotests contmued across Egyptian cities for the next
Some Egypf

as copycat acts em ;a~s resorted .t~ the ~xtre~e act of self-immolation

During a one w ~ atmg .Bouaztzt setting himself on ftre in Tunisia.
which led to ~e span m Januazy three activists carried these out
the insurgents M ~ prote~ts ~Hashem 2011 ). In an attempt to appease
cabinet but h h~ arak dtsrnissed his government and eliminated the
250 ooo'
e lfllself refused to step down. On January 31st about
'
people gather d · Tahrir
for free and 1l .
Square, the European Union called
.e ~
large amount arrfe1ec~wns m Egypt, and investors worldwide withdrew

s 0 capital en mass (AP Press 2012).
for pl~ keCJ? the momentum going Egyptian citizens used Twitter
@Tahrirs g ?tscussions under the hashtag #25. One unique site,
SUpplies ~~pl: was_ used to coordinate donations for medical
in the past 0 er assistance to Tahrir demonstrators, something that
advantag ~0~~ have occurred in a very limited fashion without the
provided~ 0 dtgttal technologies and social media. Citizen journalists
them thr ootage ?f the situation through mobile phones and circulated
awaren ough SOCial networking sites which helped to increase global
broadcae~s of th~ happenings in Tahrir square. The images were then
opinion~ ~n mamstrearn media which influenced international public
began t m avor of the protesters as many supporters outside of Egypt
power ~~ressure their own governments to force Mubarak to cede
lllainstr Ir 2011). In other types of symbiotic relations between
1azeera eam and new media, Livestream viewers could watch the AI
Faceb channel on podcasts over the Internet and through its
aion °?k page and Twitter feeds. During the ftrst two days of protests
e VIewership of the channel increased by 2, 500% (Nir 2011).
25th
The organizers also spread the infonnation about the January
had events through peer-to peer sharing over a Facebook page which
auth a~~ut 400,000 members, and which allowed them to elude the
acfi ~hes (Hauslohner 2011 ). For example, to throw off the police
in ~~ stated publicly that they would gather at a particular place and
rea~hctpation, the police would mobilize to meet them there only to
Ill ~ they had been fooled as the protesters annoooced the actual
a:~lllg pla~e online. This is another example of how. conn~~ty
a gst soctal movement actors is being transformed m the digJtal
ge.
T

pla
The framing of the revolution. in the ~ets emphasized, in. a
:fi ~~ Way, the significance of soetal media and the Internet m
"Ostenng the uprising. Popular signs read: ..Mubarak is offline" and
e'!::I~e Mubarak" (www.mideastrei?orts.org).. Ghonim e~~laine_d the
Ctiveness ofFacebook in motivatmg Egyptians to partictpate m the

-
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high-risk activities this way: "This wasn't a page that tells people what
to do; this was a page that asked people, 'What should we do?' and
created surveys. Then, based on the most liked choices, actions took
place..... Anonymity was critical - and not only for security
reasons .... Contrary to what many people would think, the anonymity
· added a lot of legitimacy to the page. And why? Because people could
connect directly to the cause .... The moment the footage started
coming in, there was another lesson learned. People were very happy
sharing their photos. Why? Because of the instantaneous feedback.
The moment you upload the photo on the page, hundreds of likes, tons
of comments, and it made everyone happy that they took part. So all of
this played a critical role in building the DNA, the credibility between
the page members and the page, despite the fact they didn't know who
was running it'' (McNally 2012).
.
Thus, similar to the case of Tunisia, with access to new media
venues communication in Egypt was no longer constrained by political
or economic forces as it had been with mainstream or state-controlled
media. Through social networking sites all citizens were free to
participate in dialogue on equal terms. Ghonim's elaboration on the
impact that Facebook had on the rebellion is an example of what
Castells (2001) refers to as the "electronic grassrooting of democracy"
as activists exchanged ideas and information horizontally through
geographically diffuse networks. His explanation also illustrates that
new media outlets lend themselves to alternative organizational
dynamics and structures which are grassroots in nature, often
leaderless, and based on peer-to-peer exchanges of communication
that help to recruit new members and accelerate protest activity.
j

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

\

Il

I

The government's initial reaction to the activists' protest
acti~ty on the streets was straightforward (a violent one), but l~s
conststent when it came to harnessing and counteracting activism lll
cyberspace. When the sparks of the revolutionary fervor began the
S?vernment. assumed that allowing citizens to vent online ~ould
diffuse offime protests so it allowed these tools to remain acttvated
~owar? and Hussain 2013). However, when action did manifest itself
m public ~~ces in such a fonnidable way security forces began to
suppress digttal media, but it was too late. On January 28th, when the
government fully restricted the Internet, F acebook, Twitter,
Blackberry Messenger Services and cell phone access the uprising was
already underway and the organizing was for the most part complete
as to where, when, and how to participate in the struggle.
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In the ensuing weeks activists and authorities engaged in a
cyberspace cat and mouse game. For example, to get around the
blockade citizens accessed Google's app, speak2tweet which allowed
them to dial an international number and then send their voice
messages as tweets with the word #Egypt added as a hashtag to
Internet links. Organizers also encouraged supporters to use Twitter
because it allows users to adopt pseudo names and manually set their
location or to choose "worldwide" in order to circumvent the blocking
system (Snider and Faris 2011). However, technology, as noted, is a
ne~tral. tool and can be utilized by both challengers and the target of
therr discontent. Authorities cannot only block or disrupt services but
can ~lso use manipulation and deceit through the anonymity that social
media provides. For instance, when access to digital media was
restored pro-Mubarak supporters got onto the Khalid Said Facebook
page and added wall posts and comments that criticized the protesters,
d~ded Mubarak be given a chance to remain in power, and
clauned that the upcoming protests were cancelled (Karr and Le Coz
2012). They also sent pro-Mubarak propaganda via text messages.
Another point of comparison to the Tunisian case is that the
alternative press provided a crucial resource in the struggle.
Independent Egyptian newspapers such as AI Shorouk and AI Masry_ AI
Yorum played a fundamental role in getting information out regarding
the revolution. The former went from a distribution of 30,000 to
180,000 copies, and the latter doubled to 200,000 dltring the rebellion
(Snider and Faris 2011). In these strategic ways demonstrators fo~ght
to manage the interpretation of the reality on the ground ~d relay. It to
the outside world and in doing so petitioned the mtematiOnal
community for support.
'
Despite government claims that the social move~ent act~
Were inspired and driven by outside forces, amateur Journabsts
accessed social media and alternative media outlets to rebuke the
government's accusations. Their use of new media, therefore,
~evented government propaganda from discrediting them because the
hve images that they captured and uploaded onto YouTub~, t?e
Internet, and social networking sites permitted them to bypass editonal
spin and the filter of state-controlled media. This tranSParency of the
government's response countered the rumor/propaganda. a~~p~~
the authorities and further damaged Mubarak's credibihty
domestically and internationally. Thus, Egyptians were ~ble to pre~~t
What has happened in many attempted but failed revolutiOns; atrocttles
go unnoticed by the global community until several years later
documents ftlter out because of the governments' control of the m .~a
Which allows them to avoid critique or repercussions from the outst e
World.
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Back on the streets, despite the determination of the
demonstrators to remain nonviolent, the government continued to
accelerate the aggressive attacks on them. On February 2nd police rode
horses and camels into the crowds of protesters in what was the most
violent day of the revolution up to that point, resulting in the "battle of
the camels" (Chivers 2012). Once again, akin to the situation in
Tunisia, support for the opposition only grew when the government
perpetuated the violence. A coalition of youth groups called for
another mass demonstration on February 4th called the "Day of
Departure." In Cairo one million people protested and by February 7th
thousands were camping in Tahrir Square (Chivers 2012).
Both political process and political mediation theories can
help make sense of these developments. The political mediation
framework highlights how the reading of the political context can spur
collective behavior and consequently alter the strategies and tactics
participants choose, especially when there is belief and hope in a
conceivable triumph. Political process theory emphasizes the
importance of a division among elites that activists can use as leverage
and to their strategic advantage. In the case of Egypt, although the
army was deployed in and around the square it did not use violence
against the occupiers (Dreyfuss 2011 ). This may have been to increase
its chance of staying in power after Mubarak's ouster as it was clear
the agitators were now legitimate contenders and were gaining new
allies both within and from outside the country, and had established
Tilly's conceptualization ofWUNC. At any rate, the fracture between
the military and government helped to sustain the protest activity. .
The protest actions eventually led to the collapse of the regune
when Mubarak resigned on February 1 fh and handed over power to
the ~· The military dissolved the Parliament, suspended the
Co~titut~on, and promised to lift the thirty year emergency laws
(Kirkpatrick 2012). In July more than two dozen officials were
charged with murder, attempted murder and terrorism. Mubarak was
sentenced to life in prison on June 1st and charged with being an
accessory in the death of more than two hundred and forty
demonstrators (Kirkpatrick 2012).
When the generals took over as the interim government,
==~· it ~as apparent that they were not competent to govern. In
tion With ~e slow economic and political progress protesters
return~ to Tahrir Square in late July. On August 1st Egyptian troops
~~~hce officers forcefully cleared the sit-ins (Kirkpatrick and Stack
and v~t'!!~~llo~g sununer, in 2012, Egyptians went to the pol~
Muslun Brotherhood into power and Mohammed Morst
beeame the first
dem
elected b 0 n1
ocraticallY elected leader of Egypt. He was
Y Y 51% of the vote, largely because there was no other
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real alternative on the ballot (Levinson 2013). The only other
contender was a member of Mubarak's despised previous regime (the
Prime Minister}, so Morsi's electoral victory was less than impressive.
Additional problems continued to loom as many were suspect of the
intentions and agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood, and of Morsi's
overreach of political power, especially when he declared that he had
authority over the courts until a new Constitution was passed and a
new Parliament established (Levinson 2013). This was purportedly to
make sure that the new Constitution was not influenced by Mubarak's
previous regime.
Egyptians responded to this acquisition of power with more
demonstrations. The president, in turn, reacted to the discontent with
the imprisonment and torture of activists and journalists. After
securing a majority in Parliament following the elections the
Br~th~hood took control of writing the new Constitution and under
therr Jurisdiction added new interpretations of Sharia law and
c~~ued to consolidate power leaving almost no room for other
pohttcal actors to take part in any state institutions (Isango 2013?·
~any Egyptians viewed the country as drifting toward a theocrattc
dictatorship, thus short-circuiting the promise of Arab Spring.
.
The hopes of Arab Spring continued to diminish as P~liament
failed to pass any significant reforms, the economy continued 0
worsen, and tourism (a major economic asset) dropped by 20Yo
(Finamore 2013). Frustrated citizens therefore forged another
~evolutionary attempt largely through the Tamarod (which translates
mto "!ebellion" in Arabic) opposition, made up of a group_ of young
~g~zers who began mobilizing against the new dictator. It
distributed petitions throughout the country that named a number of
· · e "We
re~ons why, in their words and referring to the Morst regtm ' .
R<:Ject You." Among the complaints the petition noted _the secunty
failure and rising crime rates throughout Egypt, increasmg poverty,
and the absence of accountability for those killed in the January
protests, estimated at nearly nine hundred (Finamore 2013). . .
. The petition was a clever tactic because it allowed a~=ts t~
avotd the physical violence that was prevalent under the Mu al an
Morsi regimes when they occupied public spaces. This was so :
~entrali~d mobilization made up v_olunteers who en~ge: f~t a:.s
oremost m an education campatgn that emphastze fu~ d
economic, political and social woes. They linked the frequent e and
electri ·
'
.
· g unemployment, an
th CI~ shortages, rising food pnces, growtn
ental policies
: drasttc drop in the stock market to structural ~overnm . citizenS
~tnamore 2013). An estimated twenty-two milbon Egyptian eedin
Stgned th
..
. d th B therhood. far exc
g
th
. . e petition to oust Morst an ~ ro 2013). The petition
e ongma1 goal of fifteen million (Fmamore
·

!
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embraced three central demands: express a no confidence vote of
Morsi, reinstate the goals of the January revolution, and hold early
presidential elections. To put this in perspective, Morsi received only
eleven million votes that got him elected (one half of the votes which
were cast to get him out of office).
Morsi refused to back down and described those critical of his
administration as "traitors" in his now infamous speech (Hubbard
2013). This led to a rupture among some of his most high-ranking
supporters and ultimately hastened his political demise. Following the
statement his entire cabinet issued a statement on the government's
official Twitter account claiming: "The cabinet declares its rejection of
Mr. Morsi's speech and his pushing the country toward a civil war.
The cabinet announces taking the side of the people" (Finamore 2~1.3).
Foreign Minister, Mohamed Kamel Amr resigned from his posttton
and six other ministers announced their resignations as well. On the
first of July, 2013 the military, historically and still the most powerful
institution in Egypt, gave Morsi an ultimatum under which be had
forty-eight hours to respond to the demands of the protesters (Hubbard
2013). If he refused they warned that they would forcefully remove
him from office, which they did on July 3rd.
.
In another surprising move the ultra-conservative lslamtc
party, al Nour, also broke ties with the Brotherhood, and in fact backed
the military coup despite the group's obvious approval of the return to
Islamic law that the new Constitution initiated. Al Nour had tried, but
failed to convince the Brotherhood to form a broader coalition with
groups of varying political persuasions, and to hold early presidential
elections (Hubbard 2013). The sheer number of challengers and
Morsi's refusal to recognize their grievances persuaded AI Nour that
for their own political survival it was imperative that they
acknowledge the legitimacy of the opposition. Political medi~t!on
theory can explain their positioning because it advises that political
~g~es are al~ays situational and competing groups respond to the
~wdtty of the ctrcumstances when choosing alliances, and this is often
tmpacted by public opinion trends.
Imm7~iately after the coup pro-Morsi supporters gal~aniz~d a
potent ~~ttional force to the military takeover. On July 7 soldiers
and pohce ~.l~ed over fifty Morsi advocates and injured more than four
hundred et~hans while they were praying outside of the quarters
"':here Morst was presumably being held (Wickham 2013). At least
etghty poople were killed a few weeks later on July 27th. The
slaughter. occurred a day after hundreds of thdusands of Egyptians
marched m support of the military. This was encouraged by the now
de facto }eader,. ~~eral Abdul-Fattah ei-Sisi (Fahim 2013). While
ramarod s mobilization efforts proved fruitful in ousting Morsi and
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the Brotherhood, the group lacks effective organizing power so the
remains uncertain. Furthermore, the country is once
agam .~ authoritarian state and the two most powerful groups remain
the llllhtary and Islamist groups, though the military now clearly has
~e upper hand. This is because they have been able to build an
infrastructure, accumulate wealth and power, and sunnount a coherent
agenda over the years that other activist entities lack. These kinds of
complications make it difficult to theoretically tease out social
movement outcomes, and the ensuing complications in Egypt remind
us that revolution entails much more than overthrowing the current
leaders.

fu~e of Egypt

CONCLUSION
.
The revolutions, though incomplete, originated out of what
j
Pilfer refers to as the "theater of the impossible." The social, political
and economic contexts of Twrisia and Egypt are of course distinct, and
~suits of the revolutionary activity in these countries will take years to
dtscern. What they both demonstrate, however, is that across Egypt
and Tunisia it was, at least initially, digital media- a new and critical (
1
resource that provided new venues of communication for 11
1
ex~ressing grievances, an activity that was previously deemed
Ullunaginable in these relatively shielded and oppressed societies. New
,I
Web-based outlets significantly enhanced the public communicative
j
sphere for citizens and led to combative forms of collective behavior
that helped sustain the insurgencies. Young people in particular fmmd
·~
a. safe and anonymous platform for political conversation. and
j
discussion in cyberspace which permitted them to collecttvely
challenge the political and economic structures. Although the two
countries are hardly thriving democracies (though Tunisia is !flUCh
~
closer than Egypt at this point), we can expect that the changes m the
~j
conununication field will continue to serve as an invaluable resource
.~•'~.
as the struggles continue.
·]
One of the things that allowed the unpopular dictatorships.i n •
Tuni~ia and Egypt to survive for so long is th~t. in the past, de~ptte
,
~~wmg grievances among the masses of Tmnstans _and_ E~ttans,
Citizens had no way of knowing whether their own dtssatisfactron or
j
revolutionary passion was shared by others_(apart fr~m a small group
1
they might know personally, i.e. strong ties). G~mg beyond these
j
llersonal and small pockets of resistance, however, ~ order for a
fiedged social movement to emerge it is essential that potenttal
activists realize that others are also willing to ~o?t the
Tunisia and Egypt social movement actors sobdified weak ttes m
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cyberspace through which they began building community and
decentralized forms of organizing that fostered a sense of collective
identity and erupted in revolutions on the streets, where strong ties
were forged in the midst of the violent backlash by the authorities.
The insights :from these two cases have implications for
theorizing contentious politics not only regarding the impact that new
media have on collective behavior, but also challenge and contribute to
the recent literature on social movements. They illustrate that the new
media ecology creates new social and political spheres because
activists no longer have to depend on "open" political systems in the
traditional sense which political process theory refers to. Digital
technologies are helping citizens to create new, albeit virtual, political
openings and ways to participate in political discourse that were not
available in the past. This, in turn, increases the vulnerability. of
authorities in different ways. Citizen journalists, as these cases depict,
can influence public opinion by disseminating live coverage of events
on the ground to which citizens both within and outside of the country
respond to, and this sends a signal to the activists that they are
succeeding and assists with recruitment efforts. The injustice frames
that they circulated also gained them WUNC and invested the young
agitators with a sense of agency. The new communication terrain,
therefore, allows protesters to alter the power relations as the hard
physical power at the disposal of the state can be undennined by the
soft power of amateur journalists.
The availability of these new tools tools in activists' repertoire
of c~ten~on call for an updating of traditional versions of resource
mobiliZation theory and also assist in conceptually bridging the why
~d how of social movement activity (and in doing so highlights the
mt~c~ection between structural- and micro-level dynamics).
ActtVISts established weak ties through preexisting social connecti~ns
peer~to-peer, thus demonstrating the relationship between informatiOn
~~g and pr~test activity in local communities and exemplifYing the
t?aditid, or spillover affect that new media enables. SMOs ~d
~l, external resources, as well as access to mainstream media
are less llllportant for contemporary social movement actors because
m0 b1"Iizattons
·
grassroots
F"
all
rely more on alternative and social media.
md. Y. these analyses also underscore the relevance of political
me 1at1on theory because 11
•
• • •
•
f bat
.
was the subjective mterpretatJons o w
was posstble
that
en
d
·
.
.
courage the protesters to contmue the
occupations despite the repression by authorities.
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